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We have created Europe. 
 Now we have to create Europeans. 
Bronislaw Geremek 
Former Foreign Minister of Poland 
Introduction 
In the referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in June 
2008, Irish voters who voted against the Treaty gave 
several specific reasons as well as a variety of vague or 
general reasons that were unrelated to anything that was 
in the Treaty. These vague or general reasons are 
important because they probably were also significant 
influences in the “no” votes in France and the 
Netherlands. Moreover, they may be shared by a 
substantial but unknown number of people in other EU 
member states who did not get an opportunity to vote in 
a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty or the Treaty for a 
Constitution. There were positive referendum results in 
Luxembourg and Spain. Other countries promised 
referenda, but did not hold them. 
These vague or general reasons for voting “no” can best 
be described as a distrust of the EU and a dislike of 
changes or anticipated changes associated, correctly or 
incorrectly, with the EU. Some of these reasons are 
imaginary, others are entirely unrelated to the EU and 
many of them could be refuted by any well-informed 
observer of the EU. But they cannot be simply 
dismissed or ignored by any of the governments. 
This distrust of the EU and the various reasons that are 
given for it in public opinion polls are not confined to 
Irish voters or to voters in France and the Netherlands. 
What seems to be a similar distrust, and apparently at 
least some broadly similar reasons for it, exists to a 
greater or lesser degree throughout the EU. 
It is now clear that this distrust is widespread and 
serious enough to concern all 27 heads of State and 
government. The absence of referenda in most member 
states that have ratified or still intend to ratify the 
Lisbon Treaty should not reassure them. This distrust 
cannot be assuaged by a short-term crash course 
informing the public about the EU or about a treaty on 
which they might be asked to vote. The lack of 
adequate knowledge of the EU makes it possible for 
those opposed to the EU or to the treaty in question to 
make statements that are patently untrue. And while it 
is impossible to believe these statements were made 
honestly, they have, nevertheless, influenced significant 
numbers of voters. 
This problem must be tackled. If it is not, the EU will 
continue to be distrusted and will not have the support 
that it needs. 
The Laeken Declaration  
The heads of State and government themselves 
identified the problem in the Declaration of Laeken on 
14-15 December 2001, and pointed to a solution. They 
said that changes had to be made that would bring 
citizens closer to the European design and European 
institutions. The Convention on the future of Europe, 
set up at Laeken, was instructed to propose measures to 
increase the democracy, transparency and efficiency of 
the EU, but it shelved any serious efforts at 
transparency to concentrate on efficiency. 
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At the end of its deliberations, the Convention 
submitted a draft treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe to the European Council in 2003. This led to 
two proposed treaties which, whatever their other 
merits, were extremely complicated and difficult to 
understand. There seem to have been several reasons 
for this: 
-  There was no committee on institutional questions 
during the Convention. As a result, the institutional 
plans of Mr. Giscard d’Estaing were not adequately 
discussed, and their implications were not 
understood clearly, in particular by the 
representatives of the smaller member states. 
-  Almost all those attending the subsequent 
intergovernmental conferences followed the 
Convention draft and primarily discussed 
institutional measures to make the EU a more 
effective political force. 
-  The changes to strengthen the EU’s political role did 
not bring foreign policy and security policy issues 
under the existing decision-making process, the 
‘Community method’. Instead they confirmed the 
distinct intergovernmental method of decision-
making, for foreign and security policy, and 
introduced a version of that method in which the 
Commission has no role. The EU would be the only 
international body in the world with two entirely 
different decision-making procedures. This basic 
dichotomy makes the whole structure far more 
complicated and far less transparent and democratic. 
-  This complexity might not have mattered if the new 
Treaty arrangements had been based on a clear and 
intelligible concept or set of principles and if the 
reasons for them had been explained clearly. They 
were not. 
-  The added complexity is not because the Lisbon 
Treaty has been drafted as an amendment to the 
existing Treaties, rather than replacing them, but is 
inherent in the institutional structure that emerged 
from the Convention. The complexity therefore 
cannot be resolved by having a consolidated version 
of the Treaties. 
As a result, although under the Lisbon Treaty the 
powers of national parliaments and of the European 
Parliament would be increased and, therefore, in some 
respects the new institutional arrangements seem more 
democratic, the aims of the Laeken Declaration have 
not been fulfilled. The real or supposed gains in 
efficiency and democratic control are not enough to 
offset the institutional complexity that would result 
from an illogical compromise that combines two 
different decision-making processes in the same 
institutions. The other improvements are insufficient 
and of too little interest to the general public to 
outweigh the complex arrangements for foreign policy 
and security. The intergovernmental decision-making 
process is essentially undemocratic.  
Unfortunately the aims of the Laeken Declaration are 
not optional extras or unnecessary luxuries for the EU. 
They are essential for public understanding of the EU 
and for public support for it. 
Before considering what now needs to be done, some 
longer-term factors deserve mention: 
-  The original Treaty of Rome was never explained 
by any document corresponding to the Federalist 
Papers, which explained with great clarity the 
reasons for the design of the US Constitution. There 
were 84 Federalist Papers, discussing a Constitution 
of (then) seven Articles. A comparable explanation 
of the EU institutions would be longer, because the 
EU, even without the complications added by the 
Lisbon Treaty, is much more complex. An EU 
policy Declaration, setting out the EU objectives of 
peace, prosperity, and human rights in Europe, 
environmental conservation, and generous aid to 
developing countries would be valuable as a job 
description, but would not be a substitute for 
carrying out the tasks that were agreed in Laeken, 
and then put aside and never carried out. 
-  The Community method of decision-making comes 
from mediation theory.
1 It says, in short, that to 
make majority voting acceptable to a heterogeneous 
group it is necessary to have all proposals made by 
an autonomous body that is representative of the 
group as a whole. Its proposals may be adopted by a 
majority vote (in the EU, a qualified or weighted 
majority). But the interests of minorities are 
safeguarded because of the impartiality of the 
autonomous body and because its proposals may be 
amended only by unanimity. The Community 
method also involves democratic control by the 
European Parliament, and judicial control by the 
Court of Justice. Once explained, this is not hard to 
understand, but surprisingly it has never been 
officially explained anywhere. So even the reasons 
for the well-established Community method were 
not well or widely understood. This is remarkable, 
because this method and the role of the Commission 
are the foundation stones on which the Community 
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was built in 1958, and they are the reasons why it 
has been accepted as the best available way of 
managing European economic affairs. If the method 
had been better understood, there would have been 
greater unwillingness to depart from it. (In the 
Convention there was a group of smaller states 
called the “Friends of the Community Method”, but 
they did not stick to their position.) Because the 
Community method means that the Commission 
must have the exclusive right to propose new 
measures, the European Parliament is not entitled to 
propose them. MEPs who are not aware of the 
reasons for the method resent this. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that many people are easily 
misled on this issue. Even if everyone understood it, 
that would not explain the procedures for foreign 
policy decisions under the recent draft treaties which 
are based on the wholly different intergovernmental 
method. 
-  In all member states, governments have blamed 
‘Brussels’ for unpopular decisions that they have 
been associated with and that, in many cases, they 
have voted for. This inevitably leads to 
incomprehension, dislike and distrust of the EU. The 
governments have denigrated the institutions that 
they have helped to set up and which they operate. 
-  In terms of democracy, the Lisbon Treaty would 
take several steps in one direction and several steps 
in the opposite direction. In the long-standing 
economic and social sphere of the ‘First Pillar’,
2 the 
Lisbon Treaty would introduce greater powers for 
the national parliaments and the European 
Parliament. But in the area of common foreign and 
security policy, no democratic safeguards apply and 
there is no judicial control. Foreign policy measures 
would not involve national parliaments, the 
European Parliament or the Commission. It is not 
intended that the Commission be given any right of 
proposal in relation to foreign policy measures. The 
two separate decision-making processes that result 
from the Lisbon Treaty would give rise to repeated 
controversy and litigation over which procedure is 
legally appropriate for particular measures.
3 Such an 
institutional structure, whatever its merits, is 
extremely complicated, and the opposite of what 
was called for in Laeken. Since it is clear that the 
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intergovernmental approach will apply to foreign 
policy for the foreseeable future, it is crucially 
important that in all other respects the EU 
institutions are as rational and intelligible as 
possible. 
What should be done? 
Non-treaty measures 
It is clear that all EU governments need to take a 
number of measures to give effect to the Laeken 
objectives. Fortunately there are many things that are 
clearly desirable and uncontroversial and that can be 
done quickly without any change in the existing 
treaties. They should be done as soon as possible. 
Cumulatively they would make the EU institutions 
much more easily understood, more acceptable and 
more interesting to the public. These measures need to 
be taken by all the member states, not only by France, 
the Netherlands and Ireland. 
The first and most important of these changes would be 
to hold discussions in the European Council and the 
Councils of Ministers much more frequently in public. 
This was envisaged in the Treaty for a Constitution and 
in the Lisbon Treaty, so it already has the agreement of 
the governments of all the member states. It would 
make a great difference for the public to know what 
was said and done during Council meetings and for the 
media to be able to report on them. The Council is, in 
effect, one chamber of a bicameral legislature (the other 
‘chamber’ is the Parliament) and legislatures should 
meet and debate in public. This simple change would 
also enable national parliaments to see what their 
Ministers were saying and how they were voting. 
Everyone would understand better whatever difficulties 
there might be in obtaining agreement.
4 
A second simple, clearly desirable and non-
controversial step would be to establish a practice by 
which members of the Commission (not only the 
Commissioner nominated by the country in question) 
would routinely visit each national capital at regular 
intervals to discuss current EU policies and 
Commission proposals in public with members of 
national parliaments. This should not be done only 
when an especially difficult or controversial issue 
arises. 
A third desirable and non-controversial step would be 
to have regular meetings, in public, between MEPs (not 
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only MEPs of the country concerned) and members of 
the national parliament. Again, this should be done 
regularly as a matter of routine, and not only when 
controversies have broken out. 
A fourth measure would be for the Commission to 
publish papers on long-term EU policies and strategies 
explaining the arguments for and against each possible 
policy or course of action. This would help to inform 
public opinion before individual issues arose on which 
Commission proposals are needed. 
The combined effect of these steps would be very great 
even if their influence on public understanding and 
opinion might not be fully clear for some time. But if, 
as seems clear, Ireland can expect to have referendums 
again in future, it is obvious that the Irish government 
needs to do more than most other governments to 
inform public opinion. In this respect, the Irish 
government is, perhaps, in a unique position. 
More generally, the members of the national 
parliaments and, in particular, e.g. the members of 
committees of the Irish Parliament (Oireachtas) 
concerned with EU affairs, need to be much more 
active and to spend more time discussing and 
explaining the reasons for particular EU proposals and 
policies, as well as explaining the views of the 
government and the Oireachtas on them. When more 
Council discussions are open to the public and national 
parliaments are discussing the issues, there would be 
much more interest in the views expressed and they 
would receive much more attention from the media 
than they do at present. 
All this would lead, and in Ireland could certainly be 
expected to lead, to greater use of modern information 
technology. Individuals would start to participate, 
either online or by talking to their TD (a member of the 
lower house of the Irish Parliament, the Dail), in 
discussions. The European Commission’s offices in the 
member states could have websites or weblogs on 
which individuals throughout the country could make 
known their views or ask their questions. Politicians 
and Commission officials would become aware, more 
clearly than they seem to have been in recent years, of 
the questions and concerns of the average citizen. 
Phone-in radio programmes and letters to the editor 
have a similar effect but their capacity is limited by the 
time or space available. It is worth pointing out to city-
dwellers that this would have a tremendous effect in 
towns and villages far from capitals, and even further 
from Brussels, from which farmers and fishermen 
could email views, questions and criticisms. The 
democratic potential of online communication is 
enormous, but it can only be exploited if the people 
know what is going on and why. 
If all this were done quickly, it would show that all 
governments of all the EU member states have listened 
to what the “no” voters in France, the Netherlands and 
Ireland were saying, however confusingly. 
These are the concerns that governments should be 
dealing with rather than issues wholly unaffected by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Even if some additional guarantees 
were given to Ireland on issues like abortion, neutrality 
or taxation, the problem of distrust would be 
unresolved and such guarantees would leave the 
underlying problem untouched. 
It is only after distrust of the EU has been properly 
addressed that EU governments could expect to have 
popular support for the EU or for their own policies in 
the EU, or could ask for popular approval of any new 
EU Treaty in a referendum.  
These suggestions are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for popular understanding of the EU. When 
the Laeken Declaration has been implemented as far as 
it can without Treaty amendment, the next stage is to 
see what else should be done to make the EU more 
democratic, more transparent and more efficient.  
Maintaining a representative Commission 
Since the Nice Treaty, it has been proposed that the 
Commission should no longer be composed of 
nominees of all the member states. Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Commission would be made up of nominees 
of only two-thirds of the member states, “unless the 
European Council, acting unanimously decides to alter 
this number”. The full significance of this reduction in 
size has not been widely or clearly understood in any of 
the member states. It means that there would always be, 
for five years at a time, one-third of the member states 
without a nominee in the EU’s policy-proposing 
institution, which is also the body that ensures that the 
obligations of member states are carried out. Since 
there are six large member states, there would always 
be two large states without nominees, and those states 
at least (and no doubt others) would be likely to say 
that they would not accept proposals or decisions of a 
body on which they were not, in any sense, represented. 
This would inevitably and seriously weaken the 
Commission, and make it at all times less able to deal 
with whichever states were without nominees. 
One measure that would greatly help to overcome 
public distrust of the Union is both important enough 
and conspicuous enough to make a substantial 
contribution. That measure is to restore the 
representative nature and integrity of the Commission. 
As explained above, the rationale for having a 
Commission is that the EU needs an autonomous body, 
equally independent of all the member states and 
representative of the whole Union, to propose EU 
measures and policies so as to make majority voting 
acceptable. For this purpose the Commission must be 
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because they must be independent) of all of the member 
states, not just some of them. In addition, none of the 
members of the Commission must be subject to 
instructions from any other institution, whether the 
Council, the Parliament or national governments of any 
of the Member States. In short, the provisions in the 
Nice Treaty which deprive member states of the right to 
nominate a Commissioner at all times should be 
repealed and the Community method, which worked so 
well for so long, should be applied to all economic, 
social and police ‘First Pillar’ and ‘Third Pillar’ 
matters.  
There are a number of reasons why this is now 
essential:  
-  The reduction in the size of the Commission is 
probably the most important single reason for 
objecting to the Lisbon Treaty. (The Nice Treaty 
had envisaged a reduction but did not specify what 
the reduction should be, so it did not arouse the 
same depth of opposition.)  
-  Restoring each state’s right to nominate a 
Commissioner at all times would help to obtain or 
improve public support for the EU in all member 
states and not only in France, the Netherlands and 
Ireland.  
-  Restoring the right to nominate a Commissioner 
from each state would avoid a situation that would 
certainly erode public support for the EU in every 
state that finds itself, for five years at a time, 
without a nominee. No surer way of provoking 
public antagonism could be devised than to deprive 
member states of their nominees.  
-  Restoring the full Commission would represent a 
genuine and substantial improvement in the future 
institutional arrangements, which have given rise to 
such widespread distrust.  
-  This would maintain the proven Community method 
that has worked well for 50 years, which is based on 
a fully representative Commission.  
-  It would ensure that the Commission can at all times 
stay in touch with public opinion in all the member 
states. 
-  It would be the best, clearest and simplest single 
change that could be made to convince voters that 
governments, not the Commission, had really 
understood what voters are saying to them. It was 
governments, not the Commission, that were 
responsible for creating the Nice and Lisbon 
Treaties. 
-  It is a change that will be increasingly strongly 
demanded anyway as the date for reducing the size 
of the Commission comes nearer, and nine member 
states realise that they will have no nominee on the 
Commission for five years.  
-  Only a Commission composed of nominees of all 
the member states would be capable of fulfilling the 
Commission's increased role and responsibility, 
which must be to ensure that the EU and its policies 
are properly explained to, and understood by, the 
peoples. It is now clear that much more needs to be 
done to explain the EU to national parliaments. This 
needs to be done by Commissioners. The argument 
that there is not enough work for 27 Commissioners 
is now clearly wrong; there is more than enough 
work for all of them.  
-  It would avoid undignified and controversial 
wrangling over which nine member states would be 
the first to lose their nominees as Commissioners for 
five years. 
-  It would displease only those who want to reduce 
the influence of the Commission, which is the 
guardian of the treaties and of the legitimate 
interests of small states and states in a minority on 
particular issues.  
-  Restoring the size of the Commission confers the 
same benefits on all member states. It would not be 
a ‘concession’ to Ireland, nor would it mean ‘cherry 
picking’ among the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
It is a change that would be widely welcomed in all 
member states, and would avoid weakening the 
Commission. (It is true that small states would 
benefit more than big states, which need a 
Commissioner less.) 
-  As more countries join, as they must, the EU will 
become more heterogeneous, and the need for an 
impartial policy-proposing mediator to reconcile all 
the competing interests will be even greater than in 
the past. 
-  Europe today needs leadership. An independent-
minded policy-proposing think-tank is more needed 
than ever.  
-  Restoring the Commission to its normal strength 
also balances the re-weighting of votes in the 
Council in favour of the large member states, in 
particular Germany, and makes it more widely 
acceptable. This is discussed below. 
-  If the principle that each member state may 
nominate a Commissioner was maintained, no 
referendum in Ireland would be needed on this 
issue. 
A decision to maintain one nominee from each member 
state would involve a change from the Nice Treaty, but 
would not involve an amendment of the Lisbon Treaty 
because, as mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty 
empowers the Council by unanimity to alter the size of 
the Commission. If therefore it was expected that the 
Lisbon Treaty would come into force, the Council 
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have the right to nominate a Commissioner, and this 
decision would come into force at the same time as the 
Lisbon Treaty itself. 
Maintaining the independence of the 
Commission 
As already mentioned, the Community method requires 
the Commission to be representative of the Union as a 
whole, and equally independent from all the member 
states. The independence of the individual 
Commissioners is essential for the role, and indeed the 
raison d’être, of the Commission. That is why the 
treaties have always stipulated that Commissions may 
not accept instructions from any government or other 
body. If they did, they would be unable to carry out 
their responsibility to propose policies and measures in 
the interests of the Union as a whole, including as far as 
possible any member state that may be in a minority on 
any particular issue. It is also the reason why 
Commissioners cannot be elected, just as judges should 
not be elected. 
Unfortunately, some provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
are inconsistent with this basic requirement. They 
provide for a high representative for foreign policy who 
would be appointed by (and therefore responsible to) 
the Council, and who would be simultaneously vice-
president of the Commission and chairman of the 
foreign affairs council. 
The effect of this would be, and was intended to be, to 
reduce the independence of the Commission in foreign 
commercial and economic policy,
5 to place a key 
member of the Commission under the direct control of 
the Council and to take foreign economic policy away 
from the existing institutional system, and make it 
essentially intergovernmental.
6 
So the Lisbon Treaty not only envisages two entirely 
different decision-making processes, but it also would 
introduce a hybrid system involving mutually 
incompatible roles for the foreign policy representative. 
The integrity and independence of the Commission will 
not be restored only by ensuring that all member states 
can have their nominees as Commissioners at all times. 
It also requires that the role of the foreign policy 
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representative should be completely separate from the 
Commission. Otherwise the Lisbon Treaty would 
involve, in this important respect, a big step away from 
the Community method and the loss of all the 
safeguards that the Community method provides. 
In short, the proposals for a double-hatted foreign 
policy representative are undemocratic, inefficient 
(because they create conflicts), confusing and difficult 
to understand. They are also incompatible with the 
Community method, which until now has applied fully 
to the common commercial policy of the Community 
and the Union. These proposals are one of the worst 
features of the Lisbon Treaty. 
It might be said, in the defence of the dual capacity of 
the foreign policy representative, that there could be no 
objection to the Council appointing a representative 
(which is true) and that it is necessary that he or she is a 
member of the Commission, to coordinate the work of 
the two bodies (which is not true). The Commission, 
under the Community method, proposes policy to the 
Council. If the views of the two bodies are inconsistent, 
the Council can solve the problem, either by altering 
the Commission’s proposal by unanimity or by inviting 
the Commission to modify its proposal to solve the 
problem. There is no need for the president of the 
foreign policy council to be a member of the 
Commission, or to be a member of the Commission 
with special powers. A foreign policy representative 
who was not also a Commissioner could be appointed 
by the Council without a change in the treaties. The 
only purpose of the dual role is to take away from the 
Commission and the Community method, with all its 
safeguards, the responsibility for proposing foreign 
commercial and economic policy measures, and to 
enable them to be managed by the Council, by an 
intergovernmental procedure in which the large 
member states will have overwhelming influence, if 
they choose to exercise it. 
The mutually incompatible roles of Commission vice 
president and president of the foreign policy council do 
not distort only the relations between the institutions in 
connection with foreign economic policy. As a member 
of the Commission, the individual concerned should 
not be subject to the instructions of any other body. 
And in particular he or she should not be subject to the 
instructions of one of the institutions to which the 
Commission may be obliged to make proposals that 
may not be readily acceptable to some of the member 
states in the Council. The likelihood of a conflict of 
interest arising, and the possibility of influence that is 
inconsistent with the independence required of 
Commissioners, are contrary to the Community 
method, whose formula has made the European Union 
successful and acceptable. The use of the 
intergovernmental method in foreign policy matters is 
regrettable, but it is not new, and one day it may 
perhaps be abandoned. The mutually inconsistent roles Essential Steps for the European Union after the “No” Votes in France, the Netherlands and Ireland | 7 
suggested for the foreign representative are new, and 
damaging to the existing institutional system. It is 
profoundly worrying that the dangers of this suggestion 
have not been more widely understood.  
This is a serious defect. It is not merely an undesirable 
and unnecessary complication, although it is certainly 
that. To correct this defect, it would be necessary to 
amend the Lisbon Treaty, to keep the Council and the 
Commission separate, so that their respective roles are 
clear and understandable. To see the role of the foreign 
policy representative in context, it is necessary to look 
at the other new post, the president of the Council.  
The President of the Council 
At present, the Presidency of the Council is held by 
each member state in rotation for a six-month period. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, a long-term and full-time 
President would be elected by the Council. This is said 
to be desirable for efficiency and continuity, although 
the role and tasks of the President are not defined. What 
is clear is that the President will not be elected or 
subject to democratic control. Unless he is a mere 
figurehead, he is almost certain, like the foreign policy 
representative, to work closely in practice with the 
three largest and most influential member states, 
Germany, France and the UK. So the Lisbon Treaty 
would establish two new posts, clearly important 
although their powers are undefined, in addition to the 
post of President of the Commission. Such an 
arrangement, whatever its other merits, is the opposite 
of the democracy and simplicity called for by the 
Laeken Declaration and seems destined to lead to 
rivalry and demarcation disputes between the three 
individuals concerned, and their respective officials. It 
is certainly impossible to explain clearly to the peoples 
of Europe, and indeed the only explanations offered 
have been superficial and unconvincing. If the 
President were to be elected by all the peoples of the 
EU, the post would be intelligible even if his powers 
were unclear, but that is not suggested. 
Treaty amendments that would not require 
an Irish referendum 
There seems to be a widely held impression that any 
amendment of the EU Treaties necessitates a 
referendum in Ireland. This is incorrect, for several 
reasons. 
The first reason is that the Irish people in several 
referendums have allowed Ireland to ratify treaties that 
clearly envisage changes that affect, or might be 
thought to affect, the national sovereignty of all 
member states. Such changes are envisaged when new 
member states join the EU. The accession of any new 
member state means that the proportion of the votes in 
the Council exercised by each of the existing member 
states is reduced, and this of course involves treaty 
changes. Other Treaty provisions envisage that police 
and judicial cooperation matters (‘Third Pillar’ issues) 
can be transferred from the former intergovernmental 
procedures, requiring unanimity, to qualified majority 
voting under the Community method. The treaties have 
always included a provision under which, by 
unanimity, measures could be adopted for purposes for 
which no mechanism was expressly provided by the 
treaties (Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, now Article 
308). So the Constitution of Ireland, as amended by 
successive referendums expressly approving a series of 
Community Treaties, authorises substantial changes in 
the terms and operation of the EU treaties without any 
need for further referendums. These changes, of course, 
can be made only with Ireland’s consent: the point 
made here is that they are already envisaged, and do not 
require a referendum. 
The second reason why Ireland is free to ratify some 
changes in the EU treaties without a referendum 
concerns the Crotty judgment. In short, that judgment 
said that Treaty changes not approved by previous 
referenda would require a further referendum if they 
significantly restricted Ireland’s freedom of action and 
national sovereignty in foreign policy. In retrospect, the 
language of all three judges seems exaggerated. But, as 
is well known, the Irish people by referendum approved 
the Single European Act, including Title III, and since 
then have approved, by referenda, the Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, which provided for 
cooperation on foreign policy matters, and which 
therefore restricted, to a limited extent, Ireland’s 
freedom of action in foreign policy. It follows that only 
a very substantial reduction in Ireland’s sovereignty or 
in its influence in the EU, not already envisaged by any 
of the treaties approved by referendum, would require a 
new referendum. If treaty amendments do not alter the 
essential scope of objectives of the EU, no new 
referendum is needed.  
The re-weighting of the votes in the Council 
The Lisbon Treaty provides for re-weighting of votes in 
the Council. Where the Council is acting on a 
Commission proposal, a qualified majority of the 
Council shall be “ … at least 55% of the members of 
the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and 
representing Member States comprising at least 65% of 
the population of the Union.” This is the ‘double 
majority’ rule, which is intended to replace the present 
system of weighted votes, in particular to give 
Germany the additional voting weight to which its size 
entitles it. 
This is not to come into force until 2014, even if the 
Lisbon Treaty were to come into operation soon. The 
effect, when it comes into force, would be to alter 
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requirement from 7 votes out of 345 (just over 2%) to 
4.2 million out of 497 million (a ratio of just under 1%, 
but this does not allow for the increase in the total EU 
population due to further accessions or otherwise in the 
future).  
The question may arise whether it would be permissible 
under the Constitution of Ireland for Ireland to ratify a 
new Treaty providing only for the adoption of the 
‘double majority’, in the same terms as Article 191 of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The question is important because 
the large member states, in particular Germany, are 
unwilling to agree to new states joining the EU until the 
votes in the Council have been re-weighted, since at 
present the smaller states collectively have more power 
than their populations would justify. 
In 1972 the Constitution was amended to allow Ireland 
to join the European Community, and on some issues to 
be outvoted by a qualified majority calculated in 
accordance with the weightings set out in the Treaty at 
that time. These weightings were repeatedly adjusted 
without controversy in Ireland on the accession of a 
total of 18 more countries (and by the Treaty of Nice), 
and the question may now arise as to whether they 
could be re-adjusted by a clause of the kind included in 
the Lisbon Treaty without a referendum. 
The effect, as already indicated, would be to reduce the 
weight of Ireland’s vote from about 2% to about 1%. 
This would be part of a rationalisation of the voting 
strengths to make voting in the Council correspond to 
population size. Although clearly reasonable, and 
indeed more democratic if the EU population is looked 
at as a whole, small member states had previously been 
given somewhat more voting weight (in Luxembourg’s 
case, much more) than their populations suggested. 
However, at no time was there ever an explicit formula 
or rationale for the weightings, and they were always 
subject to pragmatic arguments about the relative sizes 
of particular pairs or groupings of member states. There 
would, therefore, be no basis for saying that Ireland had 
a right to expect a vote of any particular percentage of 
the whole, or to insist on the application of any 
particular formula.  
This is clear when one simple and obvious fact is taken 
into account. When Ireland joined the Community in 
1973, it was one of nine member states and had 3 votes 
out of a total of 58 votes (5.2% approximately). But the 
treaties envisaged the accession of additional member 
states, and every time a new member state joined, 
Ireland’s vote, as a percentage of the total votes, was 
automatically reduced. Therefore, it is clear that Ireland 
had no assurance that its vote, as a percentage of the 
total, would remain at any particular level. Similarly, 
when Germany was reunited, what had previously been 
a separate state became a part of the Community, and it 
was certainly appropriate to alter Germany’s voting 
strength accordingly, although this was not done until 
later. 
The question therefore is whether the suggested 
reduction of Ireland’s voting weight from 2% to 1% as 
part of a re-weighting of all member state’s voting 
rights, should be regarded as such a significant 
reduction of Ireland’s influence in the Council that it 
would require formal approval in a referendum. To 
answer that question, it must also be kept in mind that 
the Council rarely takes a decision by voting, and when 
it does, there must always be two sets of member states 
under the double majority rule, in both of which Ireland 
would always have a small proportion of the votes 
available. The only circumstance in which the 
difference between 2% and 1% could matter would be 
if the two voting groups were so evenly matched that 
there was only about 1% between them. Such a 
scenario is mathematically possible but so extremely 
unlikely as to be discounted. A reasonable conclusion is 
that the proposed change, apart from being a 
democratic rationalisation and a simplification of the 
voting rules, would not involve any significant 
reduction in Ireland’s voting influence in the Council 
and so would not require a referendum. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the Supreme Court’s 
finding in the Crotty  case that the change from 
unanimity to qualified majority voting for certain issues 
did not require a referendum. The Court was careful to 
say that its finding did not imply that a change from 
unanimity could never require a referendum. But a 
change from unanimity to qualified majority voting is 
much more significant than a relatively small re-
weighting of Ireland’s vote in the Council. 
The re-weighting of the votes in the Council could be 
done on the accession of the next state to join. It does 
not need to be done before then, and the Lisbon Treaty 
is not necessary to do this. 
Conclusion 
This paper points to a number of things that need to be 
done to make the EU more comprehensible and 
acceptable to all its peoples – not only the peoples of 
France, the Netherlands and Ireland. The paper also 
points to steps that could be taken to implement 
uncontroversial parts of the Lisbon Treaty by actions 
not requiring treaty change, or by treaty changes that 
would not need a referendum in Ireland. There are other 
matters that can be similarly treated. In particular, we 
point out that there are very strong arguments for 
maintaining the right of each member state to nominate 
a Commissioner at all times. This could be arranged by 
a simple amendment to the existing Treaty of Nice. If 
the Lisbon Treaty is to be adopted, no treaty change 
would be needed to maintain a fully representative 
Commission. We also call attention to the fact that the 
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regarded as a prerequisite for further enlargement of the 
EU, could be done by a simple treaty change without a 
referendum in Ireland. Re-weighting would also make 
acceptable the change from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting on a number of matters.  
The French and Dutch governments avoided the risks 
of second referenda on the Treaty for a Constitution 
which was not significantly different from the 
institutional provisions of the Lisbon text. For good or 
ill, the Irish government has not got that freedom of 
manoeuvre. 
The postponement of the Lisbon Treaty is hardly the 
disaster for the EU that some of its advocates claim. 
The Union has worked for 50 years with an 
autonomous Commission and a six-monthly rotation of 
the Presidency, and without a double-hatted foreign 
policy representative. There is no good reason to 
believe that work cannot proceed on new issues, 
including further enlargement if Council votes are re-
weighted, with the same success as in the past. It 
certainly seems unnecessary and undesirable to make 
changes whose main effect would be to upset the 
institutional balance and make the EU more 
complicated and harder to understand, and so less 
acceptable to its citizens. 
We believe that the EU will not be understood or 
accepted by its peoples until Council discussions are 
made public, much greater efforts are made by 
Commissioners to explain policies, and one 
Commissioner for each member state is permanently 
assured. We accept that for the foreseeable future 
foreign policy and security will be intergovernmental, 
and will not provide the safeguards for small member 
states given by the Community method for other EU 
measures. Having two entirely different decision-
making procedures is inevitably complex. Therefore, to 
make the EU more intelligible, governments should 
now first do what was agreed in Laeken, and make the 
institutional system simpler and more open. That would 
mean revising the Lisbon Treaty before it is ratified by 
any more countries, in particular to get rid of the 
anomalous position of foreign policy Representative in 
both the Commission and the Council. When those 
simplifications have been carried out, it should be 
possible either to have all member states ratify the 
revised and improved treaty, or to have the elements of 
the improved treaty adopted as a series of amendments 
to the existing treaties, for example at the time of the 
accession of the next new member state. 
It is said that governments do not want to renegotiate 
the Lisbon Treaty. But governments should not, merely 
for their own convenience, or because they think they 
know best, be unwilling to do what is needed to make 
the EU understood and accepted by its peoples.  
It is also said that the Irish people should not be able to 
veto the Lisbon Treaty. But the French and the Dutch 
also voted against essentially the same thing, and some 
other peoples would do likewise. Even more important, 
the French constitution is now being amended 
deliberately to give the French people a veto on 
enlargement of the EU, the Union’s most important and 
most successful policy. This development may have 
much more serious consequences for the EU than the 
French, Dutch and Irish votes against the Constitutional 
and Lisbon Treaties. If this is not to obstruct 
dangerously the expansion of the Union, the French 
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